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The Artemis Accords: Employing Space Diplomacy to
De-Escalate a National Security Threat
and Promote Space Commercialization
Elya A. Taichman*
“Those who came before us made certain that this country rode the first waves of the industrial
revolutions, the first waves of modern invention, and the first wave of nuclear power, and this
generation does not intend to founder in the backwash of the coming age of space. We mean to
be a part of it—we mean to lead it. For the eyes of the world now look into space, to the Moon
and to the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag
of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space
filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.”
-

President John F. Kennedy, Rice University on September 12, 1962.

INTRODUCTION

When Yuri Gagarin soared high above the earth and left its atmosphere, he entered an
ethereal and pristine realm that was without law. Dauntless and vast as space was, humans and
nation states remained undeterred. Within six years, the United States and the Soviet Union
negotiated and ratified what became known as the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”).1 Despite Cold
War tensions, diplomacy prevailed and established the first internationally recognized laws to
govern human activity to the edge of the universe. Among its many accomplishments, the OST
declared that space exploration was for the benefit of mankind, banned national appropriation
in space, and shouldered each state with national responsibility for its non-state actors in
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Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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space.2 However, whether the OST governed private citizens, companies, and other non-state
actors remained an open and unsettled question.3
The OST was drafted in the midst of the Cold War, when space flight was in its infancy
and the notion of lunar colonies or mining the Moon was the stuff of science fiction. Today,
technology has caught up with the imagination. Private investment from companies like
SpaceX and Blue Origins have driven significant growth in American space exploration.4
Seeking assurance that their investments would not violate domestic law or the OST, these and
other space companies lobbied Congress to pass the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act in 2015 (“Space Act”).5 This law allowed corporations and citizens to
engage in the commercial exploration and utilization of space resources.6
On April 6, 2020, President Trump signed Executive Order 13914, which encourages
commercial development in space.7 The order stressed that the OST allows resource
utilization, that space is not a “global commons,” and that the Secretary of State must negotiate
bilateral and multilateral arrangements with other nations on the utilization of space
resources.8 A month later, the Trump Administration announced a series of ten principles
known as the Artemis Accords.9 On October 13, 2020, the United States signed the Artemis
Accords with eight other nations.10 The Artemis Accords are a multilateral political
2

Id. arts. II, IV.
Kyle Evanoff, The Outer Space Treaty’s Midlife Funk, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.: THE INTERNATIONALIST (Oct.
10, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/outer-space-treatys-midlife-funk.
4
Steven J. Markovich et al., Space Exploration and U.S. Competitiveness, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.: RENEWING
AMERICA (June 10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/space-exploration-and-us-competitiveness.
5
Matthew Shaer, The Asteroid Miner’s Guide to the Galaxy, FOREIGN POL’Y (April 28, 2016),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/28/the-asteroid-miners-guide-to-the-galaxy-space-race-mining-asteroidsplanetary-research-deep-space-industries/.
6
See id.
7
Exec. Order No. 13914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381 (Apr. 6, 2020).
8
Id.
9
Christian Davenport, NASA Unveils New Rules to Guide Behavior in Space and on the Lunar Surface, WASH. POST
(May 15, 2020, 2:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/15/moon-rules-nasa-artemis/.
10
NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., THE ARTEMIS ACCORDS: PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL
3
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commitment that establish a system of governance for space activities.11 Ultimately, creating
such a system will spur substantial job creation as large companies and small startups in the
aerospace industry receive the legal guidance they crave.12
It is unclear whether the Artemis Accords violate international law, such as the OST
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).13 Despite this lack of clarity,
the United States and other countries are moving forward with space exploration and plan to
develop space law post hoc to justify prior actions. The Artemis Accords serve as the blueprint
for this law. However, the Trump Administration engaged neither China nor Russia as it
developed a modus operandi in space. To date, the United States has no plans to engage either
country.14 This is a mistake.
Without a strong and enforceable international regime, spacefaring nations are likely to
repeat the mistakes of prior eras of exploration – imperialism, arms races, and total war.
Currently, the United States has the upper hand in space technology and investment over
China and Russia.15 Before either catch up, the United States should initiate diplomacy to
bring them into an Artemis Accords coalition. Simultaneously, the State Department and
NASA should pursue bilateral Artemis Accords agreements with as many nations as possible.
The resulting coalition will increase pressure on Russia and China to join. If they do not join,
the United States will have developed a strong and durable system for outer space resource

EXPLORATION AND USE OF THE MOON, MARS, COMETS, AND ASTEROIDS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES (2020)
[hereinafter Artemis Accords].
11
Id. at 2, § 1.
12
Shaer, supra note 5.
13
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). This is known as the “treaty on treaties.”
14
See, e.g., Mike Wall, US military to keep wary eye on Chinese and Russian space ambitions under President
Biden, SPACE.COM (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.space.com/us-space-policy-china-russia-biden-administration.
15
Nicolas Rapp & Brian O’Keefe, 50 Years After the Moon Landing, Money Races into Space, FORTUNE (July 22,
2019, 6:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/space-program-spending-by-country/.
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exploitation and a coalition of likeminded nations to enforce it. As such, the United States
would be able to challenge and, if necessary, thwart a Russo-Chinese counter-system. Though
diplomacy will hopefully produce a united international system that aligns with American
interests, it would be imprudent not to ready a contingency plan.16
To reach this conclusion, this paper examines the legal and national security issues the
Trump Administration has forced through the Artemis Accords. The first section begins fifty
years ago with the ratification of the OST and explores the developments in outer space law
that led to the Artemis Accords. The second section considers the issues that inhibit a global
consensus on outer space exploration and resource utilization and notes the dangers that lack
of consensus will pose. In particular, this section focuses on the dual nature of all outer space
technology, bellicose American rhetoric, Russian and Chinese intentions in space, and how
these issues each hinder the creation of a stable international system. Finally, the paper
concludes by recommending that the United States diplomatically engage Russia and China to
bring them into the system the Artemis Accords propose. If successful, this will buttress
American power and influence in outer space, boost economic growth and job creation, and
bolster American national security.
I.

CURRENT LAW
All modern space law is derived from the OST. This section will focus on three of its

Articles – I, II, and VI – because they might limit countries and private actors from utilizing
space resources. Article I establishes that space exploration is for the benefit of mankind,
Article II prohibits national appropriation in outer space, and Article VI ascribes state

16

Si vis pacem, para bellum [If you want peace, prepare for war] (phrase adopted from an ancient treatise, Rei
militaris instituta, written by fourth-century Roman military expert Flavius Vegetius Renatus). BRITANNICA,
VEGETIUS (William L. Hosch ed., last visited Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vegetius#ref74438.
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responsibility for non-state actors engaged in space exploration.17 Still, many gaps in OST
interpretation remain. A brief discussion of the Moon Treaty of 1979 will highlight how its
failure to become customary international law means those gaps of interpretation remain. This
provides states with significant latitude in their own practice in space.
The section then shifts to a discussion of modern American space law. In 2015,
Congress passed the Space Act, which enabled private space exploration despite a lack of
international consensus on OST interpretation.18 The law provided the legal cover and
certainty for private companies like SpaceX and Blue Origins to pursue commercial activities
in space without fear of international legal reprisal. It also laid the foundation for the Trump
Administration’s executive order this past April, which further interpreted the OST and
concluded that space is not a global commons.19 A month later, the Administration announced
the Artemis Accords.20 Both executive actions demonstrate a desire to quickly move forward
with space exploration despite the legal uncertainty and potential prohibition of international
law. Unfortunately, while such haste may be commercially expedient, it will prove harmful to
national security.
A. The Outer Space Treaty
The OST is the closest the world has come to a constitution of space law. Although
space is a vacuum, the OST was not created in a vacuum. Today, 110 nations are party to its
terms.21 The OST was negotiated, agreed to, and ratified over fifty years ago in the midst of
the Cold War. When the treaty became effective in 1967, the Space Age was ten years old, and

17

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, arts. I, II, VI.
51 U.S.C. §§ 51301-03.
19
Exec. Order No. 13914, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,381.
20
Davenport, supra note 9.
21
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, U.N.T.S. ONLINE,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028003b946&clang=_en (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
18
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the United States was still two years away from putting a man on the Moon.22 Fears of nuclear
war and mutually assured destruction haunted Americans and Soviets alike. The Soviet’s
successful launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed American geopolitical fears of a Soviet threat in
space.23 This triggered the Space Race. Although the United States framed the Space Race as a
peaceful mission to augment national pride and scientific discovery, both superpowers feared
that the other’s military would gain the upper hand.24 Thus, the chief concerns that initiated
negotiations for a space treaty were how much militarization was acceptable in outer space and
how to avoid military conflict in the heavens.25 Upon ratification, the OST reflected an
American and Soviet attempt to codify principles to govern these concerns as well as a desire
to establish the rules early before other nations caught up.26
Article I of the OST declared that “[t]he exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . and shall be the province of
all mankind.”27 The negotiators themselves described this language as a “vague principle with
no foreseeable application.”28 In fact, the United States only agreed to this language because
there were no specific references to property or economic rights.29 When the Senate debated
the treaty’s ratification, the American Ambassador to the UN and chief American negotiator

22

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1; see also NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., THE FIRST PERSON ON THE
MOON (Shelley Canright ed., Apr. 9. 2009), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/first-person-onmoon.html.
23
HISTORY, SPUTNIK LAUNCHED (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.history.come/this-day-in-history/sputnik-launched.
24
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were responsible for a shift from the more sober and realistic
posturing of the Eisenhower Administration in space to this idealistic rhetoric. WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, …THE
HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE 418–20 (1985).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 419.
27
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
28
MCDOUGALL, supra note 24, at 419.
29
Id. It is worth noting that Brazil, acting on behalf of its fellow Third World countries, initiated and pushed the
“benefit of mankind” language. Although the United States agreed to it, subsequent American behavior
demonstrated that the United States did not see itself treaty bound to directly share in the resources and spoils of
outer space.
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for the OST, Arthur Goldberg, explained this language was a “goal subject to further
refinement.”30 Goldberg later clarified that this language was intended as a “freedom of the
seas clause” and nothing more.31 Professor Walter McDougall, a Pulitzer Prize-winning
historian on the Space Age, concluded that Article I “did not oblige parties to the treaty to
share their technology or its fruits with others: no ‘international socialism’ in space.”32
Article II of the treaty dealt with territorial claims. It stated, “Outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”33 In short, even though
the United States planted the stars and stripes on the Moon within two years of OST
ratification, it could not claim the Moon, nor any section of the Moon, as its own sovereign
territory.
Finally, Article VI required all parties to the treaty to “bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are carried on by governmental
agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.”34 In addition, all parties
must authorize and continuously supervise any activities of non-government entities in outer
space.35
In light of Articles II and VI, whether citizens and corporations may appropriate
territory in outer space and the extent to which citizens and corporations may exploit space
resources are still subject to international debate. A common interpretation of Article VI is that

30

Id. at 418.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
34
Id. art. VI.
35
Id.
31
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non-state entities have wide latitude so long as there is a “national scheme for licensing private
space operators and subjecting them to relevant obligations and procedures.”36 However, some
scholars argue that if states may not appropriate territory in space, then they lack the authority
to authorize non-state entities to do the same.37
Importantly, Article VI only applies to “national activities.”38 However, it is not clear
whether this encompasses actions by commercial actors. If SpaceX establishes a base on the
Moon for lunar mining, or if Blue Origins does the same, are those national activities?
Certainly, any rockets launched into space require authorization from the Federal
Government.39 What about when NASA or the Department of Defense (“DoD”) team up with
SpaceX in a public-private partnership? Indeed, SpaceX just completed a mission to ferry two
NASA astronauts to and from the International Space Station (“ISS”).40 Additionally, SpaceX
and United Launch Alliance (a joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin) just
received a DoD contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars to launch military and
intelligence satellites for the Space Force.41 Further, under its Small Business Innovation
Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs, NASA awarded ten grants, each

36

Frans G. von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining: International and Legal Aspects, 26 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 83, 87
(2017).
37
Compare P.M. Sterns & L.I. Tennen, Privateering and Profiteering on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies:
Debunking the Myth of Property Rights in Space, 31 ADVANCES IN SPACE RSCH. 2433, 2435-36 (2003) with Johnson
v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584-86 (1823) (holding that only the federal government had the power to transfer real
property rights to citizens).
38
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI.
39
51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2020). (“A license issued or transferred under this chapter [51 USCS §§ 50901 et seq.], or a
permit, is required for the following: for a person to launch a launch vehicle or to operate a launch site or reentry
site, or to reenter a reentry vehicle, in the United States”).
40
Jackie Wattles, How SpaceX and NASA Overcame a Bitter Culture Clash to Bring Back U.S. Astronaut Launches,
CNN BUS. (Aug. 10, 2020, 1:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/business/spacex-nasa-astronaut-launchdemo-2-culture-clash-scn/index.html.
41
Dave Mosher, How SpaceX Outmaneuvered Blue Origin and Other Rivals to Clinch a Prized Space Force Launch
Agreement Worth Billions, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 11, 2020, 3:40 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex- winsspace-force-rocket-launch-nssl-agreement-40-percent-2020-8.
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worth $125,000 to “develop technologies for in-situ resource utilization.”42 These technologies
will enable astronauts to extract and process lunar ice to create water, oxygen, and rocket
fuel.43 The OST never explicitly contemplated commercial activities like asteroid or lunar
mining because in the 1960s those technologies were far flung fantasies.44 Now they are real.
But the meaning and application of the “constitution of space law” remains misty. Therefore,
to interpret the OST, it is essential to examine state practice and opinio juris.
Once again, context matters. On March 13, 1967, in a letter to Senator Clinton
Anderson, James Gehrig, Chief of Staff on the Senate Space Committee throughout the debate
on the OST, explained “most of the policies established [in the OST] are U.S. policies . . . In
not too many years many nations will be in space. It is to the advantage of the US to establish
space law now.”45 The United States and the Soviet Union, as the preeminent space powers,
were eager to codify space law to suit their interests as superpowers before other nations
possessed the technological clout to interfere and participate in lawmaking.46 For the United
States this was especially urgent because, at this point, its space program outstripped that of
the Soviets.47
Though lacking in specifics, the OST aimed to create a regime in which space
exploration could flourish. Article IV of the OST banned nuclear weapons in space and
military bases on the Moon, which prevented an imperialistic race to claim American or Soviet
zones on the Moon.48 Moreover, though it would have benefitted non-spacefaring nations,

42

Douglas Messier, NASA Selects 10 Small Business Proposals for Lunar ISRU, PARABOLIC ARC (July 9, 2020),
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2020/07/09/nasa-selects-10-small-business-proposals-for-lunar-isru/.
43
Id.
44
Von der Dunk, supra note 36, at 85.
45
MCDOUGALL, supra note 24, at 525, n.27.
46
Id. at 419.
47
Id. Interestingly, the same holds true today with, except that American space capabilities and investment outstrip
those of Russia and China combined.
48
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
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Article I avoided establishing the Moon and outer space as a global commons that belonged to
all. Instead, it simply included that space exploration was for the benefit of mankind, which the
negotiators described as a “vague principle with no foreseeable application.”49 Vague was
good. It enabled Americans and Soviets to continue technological development and space
exploration without sharing these advances with less developed nations or worrying about
property rights. McDougall concluded that the OST was a facade under which “governments
pretend[ed] to regulate the growth of space technology while it was still in its infancy.”50
Space technology was developing rapidly, far more rapidly than international legal committees
at the UN could accommodate.51 As technology changed, so could the rules. For the OST “the
spirit, not the letter, was the essence.”52 However, since the Moon Treaty failed to update the
OST, gaps in OST interpretation remain to this day.
B. The Moon Treaty: A Failed Attempt
Signed in 1979 by only four states, the Moon Treaty tried to pick up where the OST
left off.53 Article XI of the Moon Treaty declared that the Moon was the “common heritage of
mankind.”54 It then stated that the Moon, its surface, and its subsurface cannot become the
property of any state or “non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”55 However, unlike
the OST, the Moon Treaty explicitly contemplated commercial activities on the Moon because
the next sentence explained, “placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities,
stations and installations on or below the surface of the moon . . . shall not create a right of

49

MCDOUGALL, supra note 24, at 419.
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 420.
53
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec.
18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter Moon Treaty] (entered into force Jul. 11, 1984).
54
Id., art. XI, ¶ 1.
55
Id. art. XI, ¶ 3.
50
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ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the moon or any areas thereof.”56 Indeed,
signatories to the treaty agreed to establish an “international regime, including appropriate
procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation
is about to become feasible.”57
But the Moon Treaty failed! Today, only eighteen nations are party to its terms, and
over forty years after its creation, lunar resource exploitation is still not quite feasible.58
Nevertheless, the treaty matters precisely because it failed. Since it was meant to clarify holes
in the OST, its resounding rejection by the major spacefaring nations “is itself subsequent
practice that can help interpret ambiguous provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.”59 Since most
nations of the world rejected the principles of the Moon Treaty that clarified the OST, the OST
remains vague with substantial room for interpretation. However, it is abundantly clear that the
OST does not definitively prohibit non-state actors from obtaining property rights on the
Moon. To date, there is still no treaty or customary international law that explains the rules for
private actors in space.60
C. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (“Space Act”): The Dawn
of the Second Space Age
Until recently, it did not matter that the OST was unclear, and the Moon Treaty failed
to garner support. Space exploration remained the province of state actors like NASA because
the sheer expense of rocketry and other technologies remained beyond the reach of private
corporations and investors throughout the twentieth century.61 However, over the last two

56

Id. art. XI, ¶ 5.
Id.
58
U.N.T.S. ONLINE, supra note 21.
59
Melissa Durkee, Interstitial Space Law, 97 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 423, 459 (2019).
60
It is worth noting that France and India, both of whom have space programs, are party to the Moon Treaty.
However, it is hard to argue that with 18 total nations agreeing to its terms, and without the big three spacefaring
nations – the United States, Russia, and China – that the Moon Treaty has become customary international law.
61
Steven J. Markovich et al., Space Exploration and U.S. Competitiveness, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Feb. 23,
57
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decades the industry has changed rapidly. In the United States alone, several of the most
innovative companies have invested in space exploration technology.62 As the research
accelerates, costs have decreased, and the potential for profits is tremendous – in 2018 the
space economy was $360 billion.63 By 2040, its estimated worth is anywhere between $1.1
trillion and $1.7 trillion.64 However, investors demand certainty, and the uncertainty
surrounding OST interpretation was reason to pause.65 After all, no investor or company
wanted to pour millions, or even billions, into a company designed to mine liquid ice on the
Moon only to discover that this violated international law and that the United States had
decided to stop licensing such ventures.
Just as President Eisenhower feared, the military-industrial complex, augmented by
private industry, lobbied Congress heavily to reduce regulatory hurdles and legal uncertainty
in space investment.66 In 2015, their efforts bore fruit when Congress passed the Space Act,
which President Obama signed into law.67 Chapter 513 of Subtitle V – “Space Resource
Commercial Exploration and Utilization” – was the shift that enabled the American private
space industry to flourish. This affirmed that American citizens could own and sell any “space
resources” that were obtained through “commercial recovery.”68 In one stroke, Congress

2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/space-exploration-and-us-competitiveness.
62
Marc Vartabedian, Space Startups See Big Payouts in New Push to the Moon, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2019, 9:26
PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/space-startups-see-big-payouts-in-new-push-to-the-moon11563153990?mod=article_inline; see also Erik Sofge, The World’s Top 10 Most Innovative Companies In Space,
FAST CO. (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3026685/the-worlds-top-10-most-innovative-companiesin-space.
63
BRYCE: SPACE & TECH., 2018 GLOBAL SPACE ECONOMY (2018), https://brycetech.com/.
64
Adam Jonas, The New Space Economy, MORGAN STANLEY: THE MORGAN STANLEY MINUTE,
https://www.morganstanley.com/morgan-stanley-minute/space-economy?vid=6058386536001 (last visited Apr. 15,
2021).
65
See Mike Wall, New Space Mining Legislation Is 'History in the Making', SPACE.COM (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.space.com/31177-space-mining-commercial-spaceflight-congress.html.
66
Durkee, supra note 59, at 461.
67
Summary of H.R.2262 – U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262 (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
68
51 U.S.C. § 51303.
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guaranteed property rights to American citizens and companies on a “first come, first served
basis.”69 Moreover, American courts would not permit foreign lawsuits accusing
entrepreneurs and businesses of violating the OST.70 The law also required the executive
branch to “discourage government barriers” to development and for regulation to “facilitate
commercial utilization” in space.71 Finally, it required the President to promote the interest of
the American space industry.72 Ever wary of the ambiguities of the OST, and likely out of
concern that the Space Act might violate the treaty, the law included a disclaimer that it was
the sense of Congress that nothing in the Space Act asserted American sovereignty over any
celestial body.73 This disclaimer should be read as opinio juris of American interpretation of
the OST.
In 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union shared a concern that other nations
would challenge their technological preeminence in space.74 In 2015, this proved no different,
except, this time, the United States was alone in its preeminence. Russia, in fact, strongly
objected and claimed that the Space Act violated international law.75 Russia submitted an
objection to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”),
claiming the Space Act demonstrated “total disrespect for international law order [sic].”76

69

Von der Dunk, supra note 36, at 94.
Id. at 94-95.
71
H.R. Rep. No. 114–119, at 9 (2015).
72
51 U.S.C. § 51302.
73
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. 114–90, §403, 129 Stat. 704, 722 (“It is the sense
of Congress that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or
exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.”).
74
Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can it Survive a New Space Race?, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2017, 5:00
AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/outer_space_treaty.
75
UN, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Scientific and Technical Subcommittee: Reviewing
opportunities for Achieving the Vienna Consensus on Space Security Encompassing Several Regulatory Domains,
Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2016/CRP.15 (Feb. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter Russian Complaint].
76
Id. ¶ 7.
70
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Russia went on to declare that this law manifested a “doctrine of domination in outer space.”77
Nonetheless, a careful reading of Russia’s complaint to COPUOS elucidates that
Russia never actually asserted that the United States violated the OST.78 To be sure, Russia
came as close as possible to this, but never outright said it.79 Indeed, the Russians lag behind in
investment in outer space and technology and fear American exploitation of space’s vast
resources in space without their participation.80 American private investment has accelerated
this gap with NASA paying companies like SpaceX $55 million per seat to ferry astronauts to
the ISS instead paying the Russians more than $90 million to do the same.81 In fact, in its
objection to the Space Act, Russia stated that the United States “could propose discussing the
possibility to reach uniform understanding of the status of resources and set forth the structure
of the doctrine that would include safety and security aspects.”82 It seems Russia is pining for
its prior role of crafting space law with the United States. This also suggests that if Russia had
the same capabilities as the United States, its policy would likely be comparable.83
Conversely, Luxemburg and the United Arab Emirates, both small but wealthy states,
have passed legislation similar to the Space Act.84 Although both states lack the experience
and infrastructure of larger space powers, both have the liquidity to make long term financial
bets with potential for handsome returns.85 As a tax heaven, Luxembourg hopes to attract a
77
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multinational collection of space entrepreneurs and share in their profits.86 For the UAE, space
is an opportunity to also profit while diversifying its oil-dependent economy.87
D. Trump Executive Order
The Trump Administration has demonstrated a strong interest in outer space.88 In 2017,
it reestablished the National Space Council, and in 2019 it created the Space Force.89 In
February 2020, the Administration proposed a 12% increase to NASA’s budget.90 On April 6,
2020, President Trump issued an Executive Order titled Encouraging International Support for
the Recovery and Use of Space Resources.91 The order dictated that space is not a global
commons, and that it is official U.S. policy to “encourage international support for the public
and private recovery and use of resources in outer space, consistent with applicable law.”92
Importantly, the Executive Order required the Secretary of State to “negotiate joint statements
and bilateral and multilateral arrangements with foreign states regarding safe and sustainable
operations for the public and private recovery and use of space resources.”93 This appears to
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fulfill the Space Act’s requirement that the President promote American interests in space
internationally.
E. The Artemis Accords
Almost immediately after Trump issued his Executive Order, the administration
released the Artemis Accords.94 The Trump Administration presented these Accords as a series
of principles that NASA drafted to “govern[] . . . the civil exploration and use of outer space”
as the country prepares to return to the Moon under the Artemis Program.95 Using these
principles as a blueprint, the U.S. State Department, together with NASA, aimed to negotiate
a series of bilateral accords with other nations who wish to join the United States in returning
to and in participating in commercial opportunities on the Moon.96 However, NASA and the
U.S. State Department seemed concerned that the Artemis Accords violated the OST because
one of the principles, Space Resources, affirms that the “Artemis Accords reinforce that space
resource extraction and utilization can and will be conducted under the auspices of the Outer
Space Treaty, with specific emphasis on Articles II, VI, and XI.”97 This disclaimer is quite
similar to the one found in the Space Act.
On October 13, 2020, the United States signed the first agreements of the Artemis
Accords with seven other nations: Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, United Arab
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Emirates, and the United Kingdom.98 On November 15, 2020, Ukraine signed on, bringing the
coalition to nine members.99 Importantly, the Artemis Accords state that they are a political
commitment, which renders them non-binding in the context of international law.100 In an
interview with the Washington Post, NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine explained that the
accords are “intended to create norms of behavior that all countries can agree to so that we can
keep peace and prosperity moving forward in space and avoid any kind of confusion or
ambiguity that can result in conflict.”101 In a press release, Bridenstine added, “Artemis will be
the broadest and most diverse international human space exploration program in history . . .
[They] are the vehicle that will establish this singular . . . global coalition . . . [W]e are uniting
with our partners to explore the Moon and are establishing vital principles that will create a
safe, peaceful, and prosperous future in space for all of humanity to enjoy.”102
NASA made clear that these agreements adhere to and build on the principles of the
OST.103 Bridenstine clarified, “There is nothing in the Artemis Accords that isn’t enshrined in
the Outer Space Treaty. It’s a forcing function to get nations to comply with the Outer Space
Treaty.”104 Mike Gold, NASA’s Associate Administrator for the Office of International and
Interagency Relations, who was a leader in negotiating these agreements, offered, “Precedent
is important. By embracing our values, along with our partners, we’re creating a track record, a
norm of behavior that will influence the entire world to proceed with the transparent, peaceful
98
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and safe exploration of space.”105 Clearly, NASA hopes the Artemis Accords will crystalize
into norms and update the nearly-antiquated OST.
However, not all nations were pleased.106 Dmitry Rogozin, the head of the Russian
space agency Roscosmos, declared that Russia was unlikely to join the Artemis Accords
coalition because it was “too U.S.-centric.”107 He unfavorably compared the Artemis Accords
agreement with the approach the United States has taken with the ISS.108 Rogozin stated,
“[t]he most important thing here would be to base this program on the principles of
international cooperation that, which were used in order to fly ISS. If we could get back to
considering making these principles as the foundation of the program then Roscomos would
also consider its participation.”109 Bridenstine retorted, “the Gateway uses the exact same
international agreement, the IGA, that the International Space Station uses. [NASA has] shared
with Roscosmos what we would like to do with the Gateway in terms of collaborating with
them and seeing what they’re interested is, and we just haven’t heard back.”110
Experts anticipate the Artemis Accords will increase already tense competition in space
between China and the United States.111 Zhao Lijian, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman,
responded, “China has always been committed to the peaceful use of outer space. The
exploration and peaceful use of outer space is a common cause for all mankind and should be
for the benefit of all mankind.”112 Lijian’s pronouncement echoes the language of Article I of
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the OST. He added that any discussion of a legal framework in space should be achieved via
the United Nations and in compliance with the OST.113 Ni Lexiong, a military commentator
based in Shanghai, said Beijing would be concerned with the United States attempting to set
international rules with a “small group of allies.”114 Ni concluded, “So international relations
on Earth, including the rivalry and conflicts between nations, will inevitably be brought to the
moon.”115 Interestingly, Zhao Tong, a senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for
Global Policy, explained that “China traditionally believes that space exploration or moon
missions are done by state actors. From a nation’s point of view, there will always be concerns
over questions of sovereignty and security.”116 However, Zhao acknowledged that the Artemis
Accords will give American companies an advantage in commercial exploitation lunar
resources, an area where China is lagging behind.117
II.

REASONS FOR CHANGE
The Artemis Accords are a culmination of American space policy to enable

commercialization of outer space. However, they pose a variety of problems. To start, any
future agreements under the accords may violate international law – both the OST and the
VCLT. While the Trump Administration appears willing to ignore this issue, violating
international law is a dangerous precedent and should be avoided.118 Further, the dual nature of
all space technology means that any commercial activity in space that the Artemis Accords
enable could readily be converted for belligerent purposes.119 This would both violate
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international law and threaten national security. Despite these inherent dangers, the Trump
Administration has maintained a bellicose rhetoric on its space policy.120 Although American
technology and investments surpass those of Russia and China, such rhetoric serves to inflame
already tense relations. Russia and China are each pursuing their own space programs which
threaten national security interests, but the United States has engaged neither in Artemis
Accords diplomacy.121
A. Violations of International Law?
At best, future Artemis Accords agreements exist in a gray area of international law.
After all, the Moon Treaty failed to update and clarify the gaps in the OST on space
exploration and resource exploitation by non-state actors. The Space Act and the Artemis
Accords together represent American state practice and opinio juris as to the meaning of the
OST. At worst, the Trump Administration would be blatantly and knowingly violating
international law, in particular the ban on national appropriation. Certainly, the Artemis
Accords signal a willingness to push international law to the limit, if not to step over the line.
In addition to potentially violating the OST, the Artemis Accords may also violate the
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VCLT. Though the United States has not ratified the VCLT, the “treaty on treaties” is
customary international law and thus binding on all states. Article 41 of the VCLT permits two
or more parties to a treaty to make bilateral, inter-se agreements or to modify a treaty among
themselves.122 Yet, if these side deals are “incompatible with the effective execution of the
object and purpose of the treaty as a whole” then the VCLT forbids them.123 NASA made
clear that bilateral Artemis Accords agreements with other

nations will be “grounded in the

Outer Space Treaty” and that resource utilization will be conducted under the “auspices of the
Outer Space Treaty.”124 Therefore, the United States appears ready to create bilateral, inter-se
agreements every time it signs an Artemis Accords agreement. Because Article II of the OST
clearly bans national appropriation, licensing non-state actors to create mining colonies on the
Moon in safety zones verges on appropriation, especially when coupled with Article VI’s
responsibility clause based on national activity.125 Overall, the Administration advances on
very uneven legal footing, which is further compounded by the fact that space technologies are
inherently dual purpose.
B. Dual Purpose
Any technology – from rocketry, to satellites, to mining equipment – introduced into
space is inherently dual purpose. That is, it may readily be converted to military uses. The
OST makes clear that nuclear weapons are prohibited in space. It also completely demilitarizes
the Moon, under Article IV.126 However, military personal may participate in scientific
research or other peaceful purposes – i.e., commercial ones.127 Hence, from a national security
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standpoint it would be legal for other rival nations, namely Russia and China, to create lunar
bases or asteroid mines. But should conflict arise, such technology and infrastructure could
readily be turned hostile and harnessed against American infrastructure in space. This is
troubling because for a country like China there is no obvious distinction between public and
private industry.128 And from China’s perspective, NASA is still teaming up with SpaceX in
public-private partnerships and the DoD has many of similar agreements as well. In fact, in its
2020 Defense Space Strategy, the DoD proclaimed its eagerness to “[l]everage commercial
technological advancements and acquisition processes.”129
An incident with Russia highlights the dangers of dual-purpose space technologies. On
November 26, 2019, Russia launched what appeared to be a single satellite.130 Eleven days
later the single satellite “birthed” a second.131 In mid-January the pair floated near KH-11, a
multi-billion- dollar U.S. military reconnaissance satellite. The United States complained to
Moscow, which moved the satellites away from KH-11. However, on July 15, 2020, the
“birthed” satellite launched a missile into outer space. This is the first time the United States
has alleged a space-based anti-satellite missile test.132 Although Russia claimed that the
satellites are peaceful, it proved that even a so-called peaceful satellite could be secretly armed
with military capabilities. Ironically, in a speech that same day to his counterparts in Brazil,
India, China, and South Africa, Dmitry Rogozin, head of Russia’s space program, called for a
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“space free of weapons of any type, to keep it fit for long-term and sustainable use as it is
today.”133 It requires little imagination to envision a Chinese or Russian base on the Moon
doubling as a commercial mining post and as a secret military garrison. After all, when the
Soviets feared American ICBM superiority and a first-strike capability in the early 1960s they
chose to place missiles in Cuba.134 Nowadays, a similar dynamic exists, with the US enjoying
a comparable advantage.
C. Bellicose American Rhetoric
The Trump Administration has provided mixed signals to rivals about American
intentions in outer space. In 2017, Vice President Mike Pence declared that “America must be
as dominant in the heavens as it is on Earth.”135 Citing the fear that Sputnik instilled in
Americans, Pence later warned that Russia and China were racing to pass the United States in
space technology, especially with respect to the military.136 In its 2020 Defense Space Strategy,
the DoD pronounced, “China and Russia present the greatest strategic threat due to their
development, testing, and deployment of counterspace capabilities and their associated military
doctrine for employment in conflict extending to space.”137 More modestly, however, Stephen
Kitay, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, made clear that the United
States is still superior in space capabilities; however, the gap is rapidly diminishing.138
Still, this rhetoric is somewhat misleading. American public investment in space
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dwarfs Russian and Chinese investments combined: in 2018, the United States invested $41
billion whereas China invested $5.8 billion, and Russia invested $4.2 billion.139 Moreover, this
spending does not account for private investment in space. Unfortunately, this author has been
unable to procure aggregate data on total U.S. private investment. However, for reference, Jeff
Bezos has claimed he invests $1 billion each year of Amazon stock to finance Blue Origins.140
Elon Musk spent $100 million to found SpaceX in 2002.141 In 2019, the company raised $1.33
billion in three rounds of funding.142 Additionally, SpaceX has estimated its broadband
satellite project, Starlink, will cost at least $10 billion to build and deploy.143 Finally, Bryce
Technology reported that start up space ventures raised $5.7 billion in funding in 2019.144
Whatever the total number is, it is quite large and likely in the tens of billions a year. Russia
and China simply do not have the same level of private investment. This is not to say that the
Administration is wrong for taking foreign threats in outer space seriously. It should, precisely
because the Russians and Chinese take these threats seriously. The United States should not,
however, start a space race when it is already light years ahead of its rivals, as this would
repeat the mistake of the first space race – permitting private industry, which Eisenhower
warned against, to dictate American policy and thereby create a technocracy.145 Naturally, this
talk of competition begs the question, what do the Russians and Chinese actually want in outer
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space?
D. Engagement with Russia and China?
i.

Russia
Russia has strongly rejected the Artemis Accords as a violation of international law.146

After the United States excluded Russia from the Artemis Accords, Dmitry Rogozin, Chief of
Roscosmos, fumed, “The principle of invasion is the same, whether it be the Moon or Iraq.
The creation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ is initiated. Only Iraq or Afghanistan will come out
of this.”147 More recently, he called the Artemis Accords a “political project,” and compared it
to NATO.148 When asked if Russia would partner with NASA on Artemis, Rogozin answered,
“Frankly speaking, we are not interested in participating in such a project.”149 Ominously,
Rogozin signaled a Russian shift towards partnering with the Chinese, “We respect their
results…[China] is definitely our partner.”150 In a sign of how quickly this partnership is
forming, just a few weeks later, Rogozin announced that he and the Director of the China
National Space Administration, Zhang Kejian, had agreed to “probably” build a lunar research
base together.151 On March 9, 2021, Russia and China signed an agreement to build this base
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together.152
This partnership is dripping with irony. Recall that, in 2016, Russia issued a complaint
about the Space Act before COPUOS.153 But that complaint walked a fine line and never
directly claimed that American resource exploitation in space violated the OST.154 Indeed, the
Russians appeared more interested in signaling to the United States their interest in “discussing
the possibility to reach uniform understanding of the status of resources and set forth the
structure of the doctrine that would include safety and security aspects.”155 As discussed, the
Russians care less about complying with international law than being able to shape it to suit
their own interests. Though they may lack the level of investment and advanced technologies
of the United States, they appear willing to join the Chinese who have a long-term plan to
achieve space supremacy. Of course, the creation of Russo-Chinese partnership and system in
space to challenge the Artemis Accords would render Rogozin’s fear of NATO a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
ii.

China
China’s official policy is to become the preeminent space power by 2045.156 This

means a nuclear-powered space fleet, space transport for humans, and mining colonies on the
Moon, Mars, and asteroids.157 President Xi Jinping has described the Chinese space program
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as “part of the dream to make China stronger.”158 The head of China’s Moon missions, Ye
Peijian, later compared China’s role in the space race to its claim over disputed islands in the
East and South China Seas, “We will be blamed by our descendants if we don’t go there . .
.and others get there before us.”159 Unlike the United States, where private industry heavily
influences space policy, only the Communist Party and President Xi Jinping drive a policy that
is farsighted and less vulnerable to annual budgetary negotiations or party politics.160 As
Namrata Goswami said, “China is best placed to win a space race, given its well-coordinated,
disciplined, technocratic system, able to set and maintain long-term goals, with a vast
population and talent base.”161
Many American policy experts trust the Chinese space program and see it as benign.162
They argue the program is civil in nature and worthy of trust, especially for scientific
cooperation.163 This argument also stipulates that China is not racing the United States.164 It
would be all too easy to allow the same fears that Sputnik launched – of foreign superiority –
from triggering a new space race. However, Chinese rhetoric itself makes clear that it seeks
preeminence for the sake of national pride and part of “the rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation.”165 China’s own plans and pronouncements demonstrate that its space program is
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primed for “industrial and economic dominance of the Cis-Lunar System.”166 By 2050, it aims
to create an Earth-Moon space economic zone that experts estimate could generate $10 trillion
annually.167 China also hopes to establish a refueling station on the Moon’s south pole.168 This
sounds oddly similar to the coal refueling stations that imperial navies competed for
throughout the 19th century.169 Even if such endeavors started peacefully, such large stake
competition over resources historically led to conflict and war. Currently, U.S. law prohibits
NASA from cooperating with China on space activities.170 This prohibition stems from the
Wolf Amendment from the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 2014. This states that NASA may not spend funds to “develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order or contract of any kind to
participate, collaborate or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company unless such activities are specifically authorized by law after the date of enactment
of this act.”171 There is an exception if the FBI certifies to Congress that certain activities
would not lead to transferring technology or data with national security or economic security
implications.172 Naturally, the dual nature space technology makes this nearly impossible to
overcome. In a hearing before the United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission on April 25, 2020, Todd Harrison, Director of the Aerospace Security Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explained, “Our policy of excluding
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China… has not slowed its rise as a space power. Worse, it may create an incentive for China
to build an alternative coalition for space exploration that could undermine our traditional
leadership role in this arena.”173 The debate about how much to limit China is ongoing and
currently holding up passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2019.174
III.

PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Ultimately, whether the Artemis Accords violate international law probably will not matter.

The Trump Administration launched ahead with its plans to commercialize outer space and
simultaneously attempted to increas American military capabilities in space and reinforce the
protection of vital space assets through the Space Force.175 President Biden has said little on space
policy.176 The Democratic Party Platform expressed support to “return Americans to the moon and
go beyond to Mars.”177 Doing so would necessitate greater certainty on what is legal in space.
Since his inauguration, President Biden has endorsed the Artemis program in general, though many
commentators and policy makers remain wary whether space is a priority for his Administration.178
Nevertheless, on March 29, 2021, the Administration confirmed that it will continue the National
Space Council.179 This is a critical step that demonstrates the Administration is taking space policy
seriously. It also avoids the usual backlash on space policy from one administration to another.
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Further, the Biden Administration proposed a $1.5 billion increase to NASA’s budget.180
President Biden should continue Artemis Accords diplomacy. The potential for an
expanded space economy creating thousands of new American jobs is reason alone to pursue
this. After all, the private industry demands legal certainty. Additionally, the Accords
themselves are broad and flexible enough that the Biden Administration would have wide
latitude to mold and form an American led space system to its own unique interests; for
example, a greater emphasis on using space technology to combat climate change. It will also
be possible to negotiate and finalize Artemis Accords agreements without violating OST’s ban
on national appropriation in Article II.
Should the United States step back from its leadership role in space diplomacy, other
nations would not suddenly halt their plans for space exploration and resource exploitation.
The sheer magnitude of potential commercial rewards is too tempting. On its current course,
space law is destined to be determined post hoc. Nonetheless, nation-states and corporations
alike would be foolish to pursue unbridled resource competition in outer space without a single
international legal system to guide them.
History reinforces this point. Five hundred years ago, in a prior age of exploration,
fledgling nation-states sent forth explorers on the high seas who rounded Africa’s cape and
sailed into the Indian Ocean in search of spices, conquest, and glory.181 Empires were forged
as peoples were conquered. Resource competition was the fulcrum of this age, and this
competition bore terrible wars.182 More recently, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Great
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Powers of Europe again raced to divide entire continents and regions – principally Africa and
the Far East – to capitalize on trade at the expense of local peoples.183 Imperialism and
colonialism proved to be zero sum games of resource competition and power. Slowly, and then
with greater speed, European states converted their newly formed industrial infrastructure to
produce monstrous war machines. No doubt, the First World War had many causes, but this
unrestrained competition was one of the principal triggers. Unfortunately, the OST “fixed the
environment of future spaceflight as one of competition among national technocracies…”184
Thus, mankind is primed to repeat the mistakes of old.
Although America remains the most powerful and advanced spacefaring nation, it
ought to lead from the front and develop lasting norms and laws for outer space that ensure
peaceful competition. The Artemis Accords are an important first step in overcoming the
obstacles and ambiguities of the OST. However, the Trump Administration’s failure to engage
and bring Russia and China into this system threatens national security interests. China is
aiming to create its own system with itself at the top.185 Russia is ready to partner with them.186
If left unchecked, this could yield two unique and contradictory systems.
Therefore, the Biden Administration should immediately engage the Russians and
Chinese to incorporate them into the Artemis Accords system. This will not be easy. American
rhetoric will naturally need to be toned down. Policy hawks may argue this threatens national
security, but only the rhetoric should be lowered. Defense spending and technological
advancement in space should continue187 – America’s foes cannot be trusted to comply
183
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without some fear of repercussion.
Any potential solution demands a consideration of both carrots and sticks. The Chinese
want a seat at the table and respect for their space program. NASA should work with Congress
to modify the Wolf Amendment to permit limited American Chinese cooperation in space.188
Charles Bolden, the former NASA Administrator, said the Wolf Amendment is a “significant
legal constraint” and “hindrance” and urged that it be relaxed or reversed.189 This could mean
allowing the President, instead of the FBI, to certify whether a particular commercial
partnership may proceed. This will increase how nimble the United States may be in response
to good behavior from the Chinese. Todd Harrison recommended engaging “China proactively
in civil space programs when we have shared goals and when our intellectual property and
existing space partnerships are adequately protected. [But]…we should simultaneously make a
concerted effort to improve our deterrence posture in national security space.”190 This is a
sensible approach. The United States should expect China to steal technology. To build trust,
the United States must demand reciprocity and transparency.191 But, America can take the first
step by signaling a greater desire for cooperation by relaxing the Wolf Amendment and toning
down rhetoric. This maintains protections for American technologies while also demonstrating
American openness to working with the Chinese.192
188
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Russia, though ready to partner with China, would be the weaker partner of the pair.
This weakness is leverage. Despite its rhetoric to the contrary, Russia may prove more willing
to join an Artemis Accords system if the incentives for doing so were greater than partnering
with the Chinese. Americans and Russians have a long history of working together in outer
space, especially on the ISS.193 This has nurtured trust, and increasing trust should form any
future strategy. The United States could start by renewing the Open Skies Treaty, rather than
letting it lapse. This treaty allowed both countries to fly military reconnaissance aircraft over
each other’s territories to ensure they are “not preparing for military action.”194 Renewing this
treaty would demonstrate that America has nothing to hide. It would build trust and set the
stage for further diplomacy on space cooperation that perhaps allowed for increased access to
observe military satellites and lunar bases.
Furthermore, Russia must diversify its economy considering oil and gas exports
account for 40% of the government’s revenue.195 Potential commercial partnerships in space
offer Russia this opportunity for diversification. This is not to say the United States should
suddenly forgive and forget Russian election interference or its abysmal human rights
record.196 These must be considered carefully in any offer or deal that is ultimately made.
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However, permitting relations to continue deteriorating is not productive and will only
increase the likelihood of conflict. Space is a rare area of overlapping interest for the United
States and Russia, which should be leveraged to America’s advantage. In fact, President Biden
acknowledged that he will “cooperate [with Russia] when it is in our mutual interest.”197 Of
course, any gains Russia makes as a result of joining the Artemis Accords should be
automatically revoked in the case of bad behavior.198
At the same time, the State Department and NASA should continue pursuing Artemis
Accords agreements with allies and natural partners. A large coalition will increase the
pressure on the Chinese and Russians to join an Artemis system or else be left out. Completed
Artemis Accords agreements with its regional neighbors – India, South Korea, Vietnam, and
Indonesia – would likely pressure China the most. In that same vein, Russia would likely fear
Eastern European Artemis Accords agreements. Even if such agreements fail to force China or
Russia to join, they will still challenge a potential Russo-Chinese counter-system.199
Additionally, Congress should increase funding for the Space Force, and the DoD should
deepen collaboration with NATO allies in outer space. If the Artemis Accords represent the
promise of commercial opportunities in space for countries who sign on, then the Space Force
is the stick. A strong deterrent threat will both increase pressure on the Russians and Chinese
as well as shore up vulnerabilities to American industry whose lifeline is tethered to satellites
and space technology.
Finally, once a strong Artemis Accords system exists, the United States should call for
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an international conference to update the OST and codify new space law. Just like the OST,
this can be accomplished through the United Nations. However, it should be undertaken only
after the Artemis Accords are fait accompli. That way, the United States can dictate the terms
of space law on an international level with greater leverage. The United States and its Artemis
Accords allies would withhold consent from any treaty if the tenants of their system were not
included. Additionally, by waiting to negotiate an international treaty, commercial space
exploration will continue without regulatory hinderance. This will serve to further increase
American leverage at any such conference.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found ways to work

together in outer space. The OST memorialized these accomplishments. While it is hard to
imagine relations with two regimes such as Russia and China improving overnight, progress
must start somewhere. The Artemis Accords are an opportunity to improve diplomatic
relations with Russia and China while simultaneously serving as a boon to American private
industry. Failure to engage Russia and China will decrease national security and hinder
economic opportunity. The final frontier demands an internationally recognized legal system
that the major spacefaring nations promote and protect. Otherwise, conflict is almost
inevitable. With the creation of Space Force, the United States has its stick. The Artemis
Accords, with their promise of commerce and economic gains in space, are the carrot. The
United States should heed the lessons of old and take the harder, perhaps slower road to a more
secure and prosperous future. Diplomacy and engagement with Russia and China in space may
not work, but lasting success is impossible without it.
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